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I. INTRODUCTION
In November of 2020, Neely Petrie-Blanchard journeyed from
Kentucky to Florida on a very specific mission.1 She was to meet with a man
named Christopher Hallett.2 A mother of two, Petrie-Blanchard had lost
custody of her twin daughters for reasons that remain unclear. Hallett had
promised to get them back.3
In the intervening years, between when Petrie-Blanchard lost custody
and her trip to Florida, she had come to blame the government for the
breakdown of her family.4 Her misgivings, however, were not typical
criticisms of the American justice system. She was not preoccupied with
burdensome legal realities—the onerous process and structural inequity—
that come to frustrate many litigants. There was something deeper at play.
Rather, Petrie-Blanchard believed that the government was actively
conspiring to keep her children from her.5 And this conspiracy threatened
more than custodial deprivation. Under government watch, anything could
happen to her children. They could be starved, abused, even trafficked.6
This fear of government—indeed, fear of what the government would do to
her children—drove Petrie-Blanchard to extreme ends. Even before
travelling to Florida, she had been arrested for abducting her daughters from
their grandmother’s house.7 Out on bail, and at the end of her line, PetrieBlanchard turned to Hallett.
Hallett was a self-proclaimed legal expert—an internet charlatan
holding himself out as a skilled child-custody advocate.8 He had amassed a
considerable reputation in Florida through offering dubious legal services to
desperate mothers like Petrie-Blanchard.9 Hallett ran his business by
convincing these women that they were “sovereign citizens.”10 This theory
holds that individuals are not answerable to statutes or court orders, but
rather their own interpretations of the common law.11 Further, he claimed
that former President Trump had charged him creating a separate legal

1. Will Sommer, QAnon Mom Arrested for Murder of Fringe Legal Theorist, DAILY BEAST (Nov.
17, 2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanon-mom-arrested-for-murder-of-fringe-legaltheorist-in-florida.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Kevin Roose, What Is QAnon, the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html.
7. Sommer, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Sovereign Citizens Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement (last visited May 9, 2021).
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system to help parents regain custody of their children.12 Despite the
universal failure of his legal services, he continued to amass clients.13
Petrie-Blanchard would turn out to be his last. At some point during
their meeting, the interaction turned fatal.14 Indeed, Petrie-Blanchard had
come to believe that Hallett was actually working for the government, rather
than against it.15 She perceived him as directly involved in the plot to keep
her children away from her.16 When this realization dawned on her, PetrieBlanchard resorted to violence. She shot Hallett multiple times in the back
until he died.17
While this appears to be the tragic tale between two Americans citizens,
the story’s true protagonist is the cyber conspiracy QAnon. QAnon posits
that an elite network of entrenched government actors runs a child sextrafficking ring.18 Although the theory has no grounding in objective reality,
it has inspired and mobilized countless individuals toward political
extremism and violence.19 Indeed, both Hallett and Petrie-Blanchard were
staunch believers in the theory.20 Faith in QAnon warped their worldviews,
brought them together, and ultimately catalyzed their violent encounter.
Their story is far from unique.
Conspiracy theory is now a daily aspect of American life.21 The advent
of the internet has allowed misinformation, masquerading as fact, to
proliferate at an unprecedented clip. Some theories are basically innocuous
outside their capacity to cause confusion. Others, such as QAnon, inspire
tremendous harm. The dissemination of such expression has been linked to
numerous instances of violence, including the Capitol Riots in January
2021.22 This article will explore these emerging online conspiracies as they
relate to the First Amendment. Despite the breadth of free speech
jurisprudence, little has been written on the subject of conspiracy. My
position is that First Amendment doctrine, as it stands, is inadequate to

12. Sommer, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Roose, supra note 6.
19. Lois Beckett, QAnon: A Timeline of Violence Linked to the Conspiracy Theory, GUARDIAN (Oct.
16, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/15/qanon-violence-crimestimeline.
20. Sommer, supra note 1.
21. Max Fisher, ‘Belonging Is Stronger than Facts’: The Age of Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (May
7,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/world/asia/misinformation-disinformation-fakenews.html; Rachel Hope Cleves, Why Americans Turn to Conspiracy Theories, WASH. POST. (Oct. 21,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/21/why-americans-turn-conspiracy-theories/.
22. Olivia Rubin et al., QAnon Emerges as Recurring Theme of Criminal Cases Tied to US Capitol
Siege, ABC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2021, 4:31 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/qanon-emerges-recurringtheme-criminal-cases-tied-us/story?id=75347445.
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address concerns posed by this speech. Despite its capacity for social harm,
conspiracy speech currently finds protection within the free speech
landscape. As these cyber conspiracies continue to pose new and unique
problems, First Amendment law must evolve in kind to regulate such speech.
My argument will proceed as follows. Part II will define “conspiracy
speech” as it is imagined in this article. Specifically, the speech at issue is
empirically-presented, disseminated online, and associated with violent
action. Part III assesses where conspiracy speech fits into contemporary First
Amendment doctrine. In particular, online conspiracy theory will be
measured against the modern standards for unlawful advocacy and false
speech. Part IV explores new First Amendment concerns posed by
conspiracy speech. Here, I argue that conspiracy speech triggers various
“market failures” within the marketplace of ideas. Contending that market
failure sets the stage for regulation, this section claims that government
intervention is necessary to curb conspiracy speech. Part V provides a
topography of recent academic treatment in the field of electronic incitement.
Finally, in Part VI, I offer a novel judicial test for regulating online
conspiracy speech.

II. DEFINING CONSPIRACY SPEECH
Before assessing where conspiracy theories fit within First Amendment
law, it is important to clarify how this article defines “conspiracy speech.”
Conspiracies exist in various shapes and forms. Not beholden to any
particular viewpoint, they transcend ideology and political leaning.
Sometimes these theories are relegated to the far corners of social thought,
operating sub rosa amongst ideological minorities. Other times, they occupy
a prominent place in the public discourse, captivating the attention of
mainstream audiences.
Many conspiracies are relatively benign,
characterized more by their eccentricity than their capacity for social injury.
The Flat Earth and staged lunar landing theories seem to fit this category. 23
Others, such as Holocaust and Sandy Hook denial, are blatantly destructive
and cause immense psychic harm to survivors and family members.24

23. Rob Picheta, The Flat-Earth Conspiracy Is Spreading Around the Globe. Does it Hide a Darker
Core?, CNN (Nov. 18, 2019, 10:37 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/16/us/flat-earth-conferenceconspiracy-theories-scli-intl; Richard Godwin, One Giant…Lie? Why So Many People Still Think the
Moon
Landings
Were
Faked,
GUARDIAN
(July
10,
2019,
10:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/10/one-giant-lie-why-so-many-people-still-think-themoon-landings-were-faked.
24. Adam G. Klein, How to Fight Holocaust Denial in Social Media—With the Evidence of What
Really Happened, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 3, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-tofight-holocaust-denial-in-social-media-with-the-evidence-of-what-really-happened-150719;
Susan
Svrluga, First, They Lost Their Children. Then the Conspiracy Theories Started. Now, the Parents of
Newtown
are
Fighting
Back,
WASH.
POST.
(July
8,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/first-they-lost-their-children-then-the-conspiracies-
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This article takes a narrower approach. Rather than assess the First
Amendment’s relation to conspiracy theory generally, I will focus on the
recent phenomena of QAnon and Pizzagate. At a high level, both theories
claim that high-ranking political elites belong to a global cabal of child sex
predators.25 Pizzagate emerged from a Clinton campaign email hack, which
was subsequently published by Wikileaks in November 2016.26 Proponents
of the theory believed that the emails contained coded messages linking
Democratic Party operatives to human sex trafficking.27 This conjecture
proliferated on online message boards, eventually identifying the Comet
Ping Pong pizzeria in Washington D.C. as a place of ritual abuse.28
Believing this to be true, Edgar Welch traveled from North Carolina to the
nation’s capital intending to liberate the trafficked children.29 Upon arrival,
Welch fired an AR-15 assault rifle into Comet Ping Pong.
QAnon also posits the existence of pedophilic network of elites, but its
claims are more widespread.30 Followers not only believe that these elites
conduct a Satanic sex-trafficking ring, but that they also direct global
politics, transnational media conglomerates, and sites of cultural production,
such as Hollywood.31 Unique to QAnon is the role played by ex-President
Trump. Followers believe Trump was chosen by military operatives to
expose the evil cabal’s wrongdoing.32 This day of reckoning—known as the
“Storm”—is said to culminate with the public arrest, imprisonment, and
execution of thousands of cabal members, subjecting them to military
tribunals and martial law.33 Information pertaining to the Storm is revealed
through a series of cryptic online messages by an anonymous poster named
“Q”34 Believing Q to possess government secrets, followers analyze and
interpret these “Q drops” in search of hidden meanings.35 While QAnon
theories originated on the anonymous imageboard, 4Chan, it has since spread
to mainstream websites such as Twitter and Facebook.36 The similarity

started-now-the-parents-of-newtown-are-fighting-back/2019/07/08/f167b880-9cef-11e9-9ed4c9089972ad5a_story.html.
25. Michael E. Miller, Pizzagate’s Violent Legacy, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/02/16/pizzagate-qanon-capitol-attack/.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Roose, supra note 6.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Q is a reference to Q clearance, the security clearance required to access Top Secret government
information.
35. Adrienne LaFrance, The Prophecies of Q, THE ATLANTIC (June 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/qanon-nothing-can-stop-what-iscoming/610567/.
36. Id.
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between the two theories is far from coincidental, as Pizzagate is generally
considered to have morphed into QAnon over time.37 More generally, both
theories borrow heavily from anti-Semitic tropes and inspire a near-religious
dedication amongst their followers.38
I focus on these theories for a few reasons. First, recent events—most
prominently the Capitol Riots—reveal these theories to be an emerging
social threat. QAnon has been broadly linked to the riots, with some
perpetrators claiming the theory incited their behavior.39 Second, these
conspiracies raise unique First Amendment concerns. Understanding the
nature of these theories—in particular the characteristics that set them apart
from other conspiracies—will better inform their treatment under current
free speech doctrine.
“Conspiracy Speech,” for the purpose of this article, is categorized by
three basic criteria. (1) The speech is presented empirically rather than
ideologically.40 Put another way, conspiracies such as QAnon and Pizzagate
are asserted as factual in nature. Rather than advocate a particular viewpoint,
they lay claim to objective reality, purporting to describe things as they
actually are.41 Unlike ideology, therefore, these conspiracies can be factually
rebutted as false. Additionally, in more cases than not, these theories are
fairly easily disproven. QAnon and Pizzagate do not lay claim to nebulous
factual realms where a statement’s validity is difficult to prove either way.42
Instead, as David Han describes, such theories exist in the “realm of
demonstrable falsity.”43 (2) The speech is associated with violent action. As
stated above, several violent crimes have been linked to QAnon, Pizzagate,
and similar theories.44 These theories produce real-world harms that
transcend psychological or informational injury. This violent potential
distinguishes these conspiracies from their less-threatening counterparts.
While the speech itself may cause abstract injury–—such as obfuscating
truth or injuring the democratic process45—it is most dangerous when

37. Miller, supra note 25.
38. Rachel E. Greenspan, QAnon Builds on Centuries of Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theories that Put
Jewish People at Risk, INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.insider.com/qanon-conspiracytheory-anti-semitism-jewish-racist-believe-save-children-2020-10;
Nina
Burleigh,
#Pizzagate
Resurfaces an Old Anti-Semitic Slander, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2016, 1:58 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/pizzagate-resurfaces-anti-semitic-slander-528950.
39. Rubin et al., supra note 22.
40. See David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
178, 184 (2017).
41. Id. at 184.
42. Id. at 182.
43. Id.
44. Beckett, supra note 19; Brian Stelter, Fake News, Real Violence:’Pizzagate’ and the
Consequences of an Internet Echo Chamber, CNN BUS. (Dec. 6, 2016, 9:30 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/05/media/fake-news-real-violence-pizzagate/index.html.
45. Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the
Fight Against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623 (2019).
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inciting followers to lawlessness. Stated differently, these theories have a
demonstrated propensity to cause violent conduct. (3) The speech is
primarily disseminated in online fora. As several commentators have noted,
the internet has profoundly changed the ways in which people
communicate.46 While technological advances have historically raised a
broad spectrum of First Amendment concerns, the free speech considerations
regarding online conspiracy speech are particularly acute. Taken together,
these criteria inform the proposed judicial solution presented in Part VI.

III. DOCTRINAL HISTORY
Conspiracy speech of the type conducted by QAnon and Pizzagate
followers implicates two distinct realms of First Amendment doctrine: (1)
unlawful advocacy and (2) false speech. Part A examines the historical
evolution of the unlawful advocacy doctrine, including a close examination
of the modern standard set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.47 Part B focuses
on recent developments in False Speech jurisprudence, notably the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez.48
A. UNLAWFUL ADVOCACY
The First Amendment limits the government’s ability to pass laws
abridging the freedom of speech and expression.49 While the right to
unfettered speech is not absolute, it is commonly understood to receive broad
protection in both courts of law and courts of public opinion. Although the
First Amendment has assumed a supreme place within our hierarchy of
constitutional values, free speech doctrine only began receiving significant
judicial treatment about one hundred years ago.50 Throughout the past
century, many theoretic assumptions that underlie the free speech doctrine
have become canonical. These philosophical underpinnings–including the
“marketplace of ideas”51 and the democratic necessity of a well-informed
polity–will be explored in greater detail in Part IV.

46. See Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637 (2015); See also Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National
Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379 (2017).
47. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
48. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“No important case
involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States [in 1919].”).
51. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).

Winter 2021

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF QANON

9

One of the earliest First Amendment issues the Supreme Court decided
involved the unlawful advocacy of violence. Although the government had
historically enacted repressive speech legislation—particularly during
periods of national emergency—its constitutional ability to do so avoided
Supreme Court scrutiny until World War I. 52 In Schenk v. United States, the
Court was tasked with deciding whether the Espionage Act of 1917, which
proscribed certain forms of “otherwise protected speech,” ran afoul of
Constitutional guarantees.53 The Defendant Charles Schenck, a member of
the U.S. Socialist Party, had been charged with distributing leaflets declaring
that the civilian draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against involuntary servitude.54 While the leaflets did not call for violent
action, they were said to obstruct military recruitment and advocate general
insubordination.55 In a unanimous opinion authored by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the Court held that the key question in unlawful advocacy cases was
whether “the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”56 Justice Holmes
clarified this standard, famously stating that First Amendment protection did
not extend to speakers who falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.57
While the “clear and present danger” test appeared, on its face, to grant
extensive protection to unlawful advocacy, in practice it was hardly an
onerous standard. Not only did the Court uphold Schenck’s conviction, it
extended the “clear and present danger” analysis to uphold numerous
prosecutions under the Espionage Act 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918.58
In the intervening years, the Court’s treatment of unlawful advocacy
has fluctuated. Deference for government suppression reached its high
watermark in Gitlow v. New York, where the Court upheld a New York law
proscribing “Advocacy of Criminal Anarchy.”59 The statute’s provisions
were general—they did not require that defendants (1) call for definite or
immediate acts of force, violence or unlawfulness; (2) use language
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons to act of force,
violence, or unlawfulness, or (3) direct violence at a specific person. 60
Despite these broad parameters, the Court adopted a prophylactic rationale,
incanting ominously that “[a] single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire
that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 66 (4th ed. 2014).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
Id.
FARBER, supra note 52, at 66–67.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
Id. at 665–66.
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conflagration.”61 This “bad tendency” analysis remained in vogue until after
World War II. 62 Reversing course in Terminiello v. Chicago, the Court
applied a reinvigorated “clear and present danger” test to overturn a breach
of speech conviction.63 Justice Douglas’ opinion clarified that the clear and
present danger of a substantive evil must rise far above “public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”64
Broad First Amendment protection would not last long, however. In
lockstep with McCarthyism, the Court’s decision in Dennis v. United States
again recalibrated the “clear and present danger” test toward government
suppression.65 Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Vinson reimagined the
standard as a simple balancing test. Finding the gravity of the evil—in this
case, violent overthrow of the United States government—insufficiently
discounted by the improbability that such overthrow would occur, the Court
upheld Dennis’ conviction under the Smith Act.66 As in Gitlow, the Dennis
Court sanctioned the government’s capacity to take preventive measures. “If
the ingredients of reaction are present,” Vincent wrote, “we cannot bind the
Government to wait until the catalyst is added.”67
The Court’s current stance regarding unlawful advocacy was set forth
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.68 There, the Court considered the prosecution of a
local Ku Klux Klan leader under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for
promoting violence as a means of political reform.69 During a Klan rally
held in Hamilton County, Ohio, Clarence Brandenburg gave a speech calling
for “revengeance” on the federal government should they continue to
“suppress the…Caucasian Race.”70 The rally was later broadcast on local
and national networks.71 In reversing the conviction, the Court eschewed the
“clear and present danger” test in favor of a much broader First Amendment
protection for criminal incitement. The per curiam opinion established the
contemporary standard for unlawful advocacy as: the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.72 Importantly, the Court distinguished
between “the mere abstract teaching of the…moral necessity for a resort to
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 669.
FARBER, supra note 52, at 70.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Id. at 5.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Id. at 510, 516–17.
Id. at 511.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 447.
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force and violence” and “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it
to such action.”73 Under this standard, violent advocacy is protected under
the First Amendment absent a contextual showing of imminent harm. The
Brandenburg test has turned out to be highly speech-protective in subsequent
cases.74
Before moving to False Speech, it is important to quickly examine the
policy considerations which underlie unlawful advocacy doctrine. Although
protection for criminal incitement has oscillated throughout the prior
century—oftentimes reflecting broader sociopolitical contexts—the entire
jurisprudence reveals an ongoing attempt to balance two fundamental
concerns. On the one hand, the Court has sought to provide expressive room
for political minorities to voice ideological dissent, even dissent that
promotes violent upheaval and profound normative change. On the other,
the Court has attempted to protect the citizenry from legitimate threats,
particularly during times of war or heightened national security. Such
balancing is reflected in each iteration of incitement jurisprudence, from the
“clear and present danger” test to Brandenburg’s contemporary standard.
Moreover, unlawful advocacy doctrine has evaded the Court’s standard twotiered categorization, existing somewhere between the unprotected lowvalue speech of obscenity and fighting words, and pure political speech
ensured full constitutional safeguard.75 As it currently stands, the
jurisprudence is skewed heavily toward speech-protection. This preference
mirrors the presiding liberal First Amendment regime that favors more
speech as opposed to less. Inherent within the prevailing dogma is the
concept of the “marketplace of ideas.” First articulated by Justice Holmes’
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, the “marketplace of ideas”
essentially posits that, in the arena of public expression, valuable ideas
ultimately will ultimately eliminate harmful ones.76 Thus, the “marketplace
of ideas” fundamentally resists government censorship, even censorship of
dangerous or hateful expression. Instead, speech regulation is left to the
democratic masses. While the “marketplace of ideas” will be examined in
greater detail in Part IV, for now it suffices to say that Brandenburg’s narrow
authorization for government intervention can be justified as a market
failure. Central to Brandenburg’s holding is the imminence requirement.
Indeed, the lawless action called for by the inciting speech must be on the
verge of happening. In this context, counterspeech may not successfully
diminish the incendiary potential of dangerous expression. Absent normal
temporal conditions, the market fails and the harmful idea wins out.
73. Id. at 448.
74. Martin H. Redish & Matthew Fisher, Terrorizing Advocacy and the First Amendment: Free
Expression and the Fallacy of Mutual Exclusivity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 568 (2017).
75. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 386 (2017).
76. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. FALSE SPEECH
While the parameters of unlawful advocacy protection have been
largely settled over the last one hundred years, the doctrinal history
surrounding false speech is far less clear. Rather, than carving out a cohesive
sphere within First Amendment law, false speech doctrine has emerged from
disparate corners of the jurisprudence. It is evident, however, that the Court
has harbored some level of suspicion for false statements since the onset of
First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, Holmes’ crowded theater example
incorporates falseness as a central factor in defining unprotected speech.77
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. is even more clear.78 There, the Court claimed
that “[t]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”79 Rather,
such statements “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”80 The Court has followed this reasoning in
several contexts, limiting speech protection in cases of fraud,81 perjury,82
false commercial speech,83 and, as in Gertz, defamation.84
Yet, the Court has at other times provided some degree of protection to
false statements. Usually, such falsehoods are tolerated to ensure a
functioning marketplace of ideas. Thus, the “Breathing Space” rationale
articulated in New York Times v Sullivan protects erroneous statements when
necessary to avoid chilling free and robust debate.85
The Court most recently addressed false speech in United States v.
Alvarez.86 In that case, Xavier Alvarez was prosecuted under the Stolen
Valor Act for dishonestly claiming to have received a congressional medal
of honor.87 The Act in question provided criminal sanctions for anyone who
“falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States.”88 A fractured court struck down the Stolen
Valor Act as a content-based restriction.89 Central to the holding was the
Act’s failure to tie false speech to some tangible or legally-cognizable

77. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”) (emphasis added).
78. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
79. Id. at 340.
80. Id.
81. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
82. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).
83. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.
84. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, 418 U.S. 323, 340.
85. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
86. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
87. Id. at 713.
88. Id. at 716.
89. Id. at 729–30.
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harm.90 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy clarified, that “falsity
alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”91
Less clear, however, is the appropriate standard of review to be applied
in false speech cases. The plurality found Alvarez’s statements to be fully
protected speech, and thus struck the Stolen Valor Act under “exacting”
scrutiny.92 Justice Breyer’s concurrence, on the other hand, distinguished
between false statements regarding “philosophy, religion, history, the social
sciences, [and] the arts” and statements that do not implicate these higher
values.93 In Breyer’s conception, laws targeting the former should be
analyzed under strict scrutiny whereas laws concerning “false statements of
easily verifiable facts that do not concern such subject matter”94 should
receive lesser protection. Because Alvarez’ statements fell within the latter
category, Breyer concluded that the Court should have subjected the Act to
an intermediate scrutiny standard.95
Although the jurisprudence is far from a model of clarity, there are some
general observations we can make about false speech doctrine. First, despite
repeatedly categorizing untrue statements as constitutionally valueless, it is
clear the Court affords false speech some level of First Amendment
protection. Second, the level of protection seems roughly correlated to the
speech’s capacity to produce social value. As the breathing space concept
makes clear, false statements are sometimes intermingled with the
expression of true ideas. Envisioned as a sort of expressive curtilage,
breathing space recognizes the ability of erroneous statements to insulate
high-value ideas from constitutional chill. Closely related is the truthseeking function of the marketplace of ideas. In this context, even false
speech makes a valuable contribution to public debate by serving as an
illuminating foil to true ideas and cherished values. As false statements are
conquered in the arena of public expression, the rationale holds, we come to
a sharper understanding of the truth. Moreover, false speech may be valuable
in various social settings, such as safeguarding individual privacy, shielding
minority groups from prejudice, and diffusing tense or dangerous
situations.96 In these circumstances, false speech can actually produce more
social utility than true statements. On the other hand, false speech protection
is discounted when the speech causes concrete and tangible harms. While
made explicit in Alvarez, the Court has voiced this preference in a variety of
contexts. Again, cases involving fraud, defamation, and government
impersonation are illustrative.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 719.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id.
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IV. CONSPIRACY SPEECH ISSUES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
With this jurisprudence in mind, we can begin to analyze how these
conspiracies interact with existing free speech doctrine. Part A will explore
the areas where conspiracy speech evades First Amendment categorization.
Part B will provide an in-depth analysis of the marketplace of ideas and
articulate why online conspiracies such as QAnon and Pizzagate often lead
to market failure.
A. DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS
1. Unlawful Advocacy
A cursory analysis demonstrates that modern First Amendment doctrine
is ill-suited to confront emerging challenges posed by QAnon and Pizzagate.
The issue is primarily one of categorization. Conspiracy speech of the type
imagined here does not conscribe neatly to unlawful advocacy or false
speech jurisprudence. As courts attempt to assess injuries caused by QAnon
and Pizzagate, they will be forced to assign the speech to either category.
This type of doctrinal sorting implicates two basic problems. The first is
substantive. Conspiracy speech includes elements of unprotected speech
under both criminal incitement and false speech standards, but is left
unregulated by either. The second is formal. Existing doctrine is illequipped to address the means by which the speech is disseminated.
Specifically, the legal standards fail to account for the transformative quality
of the internet. While our methods of communication have fundamentally
changed, much speech doctrine has remained static. The likely result will be
that conspiracy speech will receive protection and that injuries it causes will
be left unredressed. This has less to do with the value produced by
conspiracy speech and more with outmoded legal standards.97
Beginning with unlawful advocacy, Brandenburg prohibits the
government from regulating criminal incitement absent a highly speechdeferential showing. To meet this standard, the state must demonstrate that
(1) the speaker intended to incite imminent lawless action; (2) the speech is
likely be successful in its incitement of unlawful action in the specific
context; and (3) the illegal action must be likely, under these circumstances,
to be imminent.98 This reveals a disconnect between the law on the books
and conspiracy speech in practice. Starting with the first prong, the degree
to which conspiracy theories like QAnon and Pizzagate actually call for
lawless action is questionable. While there is a documented causal link

97. In the realm of cyberterrorism, Martin Redish & Matthew Fisher have deemed this the fallacy of
mutual exclusivity. Because cyberterrorism contains elements of both unlawful advocacy and true
threats, it should be analyzed under its own legal framework rather than pigeonholed into one or the other.
Redish & Fisher, supra note 74.
98. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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between these conspiracies and violent crimes,99 the actual speech may
operate by insinuation rather than explicit advocacy of action. Common
among conspiracy theory message boards are vague appeals to vigilantism
and abstract calls to “take back our country.”100 Moreover, the Storm
narrative, while manifestly violent, seems to hold that some combination of
the military and ex-President Trump will expose the purported cabal.101 Put
another way, the responsibility for action does not fall upon the average Q
follower. Thus, conspiracy speech circulating online may be more likely to
inspire lawless action than directly call for it. Unlike classic incitement or
cyber terrorism, which predicates its ideological teachings and recruitment
upon political revolution, conspiracy speech seems to operate by way of
distortion. It is the representation of conspiracy as objective fact, the
commingling of fiction and reality, that appears to catalyze followers to
violence.102 It is therefore unsurprising that criminal defendants linked to
both Pizzagate and QAnon claim to have been inspired by child safety
concerns.103 Believing their targets to be involved in child sex trafficking,
action became a moral imperative.104 How the First Amendment addresses
this distortive quality is an open question.
The intent requirement poses additional problems. While intentionality
should remain a prerequisite in any speech prohibition, the issue is
complicated in online conspiracy speech by questions of identity and
motivation. Regarding the former, it is unclear whether liability should fall
upon the online speaker or the moderator who runs the forum. Common
sense, as well as principles of individual autonomy, seem to indicate that the
speaker should be held responsible. But the issue is not as straightforward
as it first appears. Online moderators create the environment in which the
dangerous speech proliferates. As touched upon later, it may not be a single,
identifiable utterance that provokes lawlessness, but a critical mass of similar
utterances by separate speakers over time. Whereas in prior decades, the
inciting speaker may have also organized the hostile environment, in
conspiracy speech the roles are often bifurcated. The question then becomes
liability falls on the powder keg or the match.
Similarly, conspiracy speakers may have diverse motives when actually
speaking. To illustrate this point simply, I will draw a distinction between
two groups I label Disrupters and True Believers. Disrupters—comprised
mostly of political operators, internet trolls, and media personalities—will

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Beckett, supra note 19.
Roose, supra note 6.
Id.
LaFrance, supra note 35.
Id.
Several of these individuals were parents themselves. Beckett, supra note 19.
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engage in conspiracy speech to further certain agendas.105 For example, altright activists disseminated the Pizzagate theory as a means of tarnishing and
delegitimizing the Clinton campaign.106 Often times, Disrupters will partake
in such speech with the active intention to create confusion about particular
subjects and distort the worldviews of others.107 It does not matter whether
they actually find such speech veritable so long as it can be instrumentalized
toward certain ends. In contrast, True Believers genuinely understand such
conspiracies to reflect objective reality.108 They engage in conspiracy speech
to spread awareness about the actual state of things. Does this distinction
matter for the purpose of First Amendment liability and should it? The
exploitative quality of Disrupter speech appears to lend itself to greater
culpability. At the same time, True Believers, by nature of their genuine
feeling, may come across as more persuasive to active listeners, and
therefore more effective at inciting violence. Again, Brandenburg has little
to say about this distinction.
Finally, Brandenburg’s imminence prong is ill-fit to address the nature
of online conspiracy speech. The imminence requirement is said to prevent
suppression where the government’s fears of speech’s incendiary potential
are exaggerated or misguided. By limiting regulation to speech on the cusp
of conduct, the imminence prong prevents expressive chill. But many
commentators have questioned whether the imminence requirement was
ever an appropriate consideration in balancing free speech and public safety
concerns.109 Citing empirical evidence, this critique focuses on the corrosive
potential of certain speech, arguing that courts have incorrectly prioritized
immediately dangerous expression over the long-term effects of destructive
ideologies.110 Put another way, systematic and enduring proselytization into
a dangerous worldview is more likely to lead the speaker to violent action
than any single utterance, no matter how fraught the environment in which
that utterance occurs. Borrowing from Alexander Tsesis’ scholarship, “[i]t
is apparent . .. . . that under certain circumstances there will be stepwise
progression from verbal aggression to violence, from rumor to riot, from
gossip to genocide.”111 Not only is this reasoning logical, it is particularly
acute in the context of online conspiracy speech. The factual medium in
105. Jeremy W. Peters, A Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theorist, a False Tweet and a Runaway Story, N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/us/politics/comey-fake-news-twitterposobiec.html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tommy Beer, Majority of Republicans Believe the QAnon Conspiracy Theory Is Partly or Mostly
True,
Survey
Finds,
FORBES
(Sept.
2,
2020,
6:03
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/09/02/majority-of-republicans-believe-the-qanonconspiracy-theory-is-partly-or-mostly-true-survey-finds/?sh=505be57e5231.
109. Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2002).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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which conspiracies are presented is perhaps more likely to shape listeners’
worldview over time than ideology.112 What may first strike the reader as
implausible, may take on the quality of verisimilitude when she is presented
with greater “evidence.” The compilation of evidence, in turn, creates a
pressure cooker effect whereby listeners are inspired to act as their exterior
realities appears increasingly desperate.113 QAnon demonstrates this effect.
“Q Drops” are progressive—they are released over a series of months rather
than unloaded all at once.114 Many such drops build anticipation for future
events.115 This anticipation transforms into anxiety, stirring followers into a
frenzy and inciting them to act in the real world.116 Limiting incitement
doctrine to imminently dangerous expression fails to address these issues.
Moreover, the online forums do not conform to the temporal realities of the
era in which Brandenburg was decided. While message boards certainly
may resemble an angry mob in some capacities, they may also lack essential
qualities of a combustible crowd. Speakers may post–and listeners may
read–different things at different times. This lack of simultaneous interaction
makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly when incitement may have occurred.
2. False Speech
At first, modern false speech doctrine may seem better equipped to
address online conspiracy theories.
As noted above, the current
jurisprudence (1) offers some protection for false speech; (2) protection
correlates with the speech’s ability to produce value; and (3) value—and thus
protection—is discounted when the speech also produces concrete harms.117
Turning to the first criterion, there is an argument to be made that false
statements of fact—the kind at play in conspiracy speech—receive less
protection than false ideas. As both David Han and Frederick Schauer have
touched upon, “the most notable expositors of the ‘pursuit of truth’ theory of
free speech—from Mill to John Milton to Oliver Wendell Holmes—were
primarily concerned with the ideological ‘truth’ produced by the marketplace
of ideas rather than factual truth.”118 Ideological truth implicates “debatable

112. Paris Martineau, Internet Deception Is Here to Stay—So What Do We Do Now?, WIRED
(Dec. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/internet-deception-stay-what-do-now/.
113. EJ Dickson, Former QAnon Followers Explain What Drew Them In—And Got Them Out,
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/exqanon-followers-cult-conspiracy-theory-pizzagate-1064076/.
114. Roose, supra note 6.
115. Id.
116. Ben Collins, What is QAnon? A Guide to the Conspiracy Theory Taking Hold Among Trump
Supporters, NBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2018, 6:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/whatqanon-guide-conspiracy-theory-taking-hold-among-trump-supporters-n897271.
117. See supra Part III.
118. David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
178, 183 (2017); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 902–08
(2010).
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matters of religious, moral, and political truth-like the merits of Communism
or the ways in which one should live one’s life-rather than assertions of hard
fact.”119 While Alvarez makes clear that some false facts do receive
constitutional protection, perhaps other considerations present in conspiracy
speech can override that presumption.
Second, it seems fairly clear that conspiracy speech produces little
social value. While one may argue that such conspiracies foster community,
the toxic nature of those communities decidedly outweighs any marginal
benefit. Similarly, the argument that false statements produce clearer
conceptions of truth has little context here. Again, this is not a clash of
ideologies by which we arrive at a higher understanding. Rather, conspiracy
speech espouses manifestly false realities, mixing narrative with objectivity.
The costs associated with dispelling false facts are far greater than any value
created.120
Third, the harms produced by conspiracy speech are tremendous. As
stated earlier, the proliferation of this speech has been linked directly to
violent action. People have been murdered, children kidnapped, and
Capitols breached all in service of these false narratives.121 There have also
been steep costs on followers. Setting aside individuals who have lost liberty
from criminal sentencing, many followers have lost time, money, and
familial connection due to their participation in the conspiracies.122 Further,
followers have experienced psychological harms upon learning that their
chosen theory was not true.123 At a more abstract level, conspiracy speech
has a deleterious effect on the democratic process. The dissemination of
misinformation interferes with the public’s capacity to make sound, rational
choices.124 Conspiracies regarding politicians also undermine trust in public
officials.125 On the flip side, conspiracy speech can be leveraged by selfinterested actors for socio-political gain.126 Abstracting even further, such
speech can cause one to question the nature of objectivity wholesale. An
inability to distinguish between what is real and what is not can have a
destabilizing effect on individual psyches.

119. Han, supra note 118, at 183.
120. Eileen Brown, Online Global Fake News is Costing Us $78 Billion Globally Each Year, ZDNET
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/online-fake-news-costing-us-78-billion-globally-eachyear/.
121. Beckett, supra note 19; Rubin, supra note 22.
122. Greg Jaffe & Jose A. Del Real, Life Amid the Ruins of QAnon: ‘I Wanted my Family Back’,
WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/conspiracytheories-qanon-family-members/.
123. Id.
124. Bethany Albertson & Kimberly Guiler, Conspiracy Theories, Election Rigging, and Support for
Democratic
Norms,
RSCH
&
POLITICS
(Sept.
2020),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168020959859.
125. Id.
126. Peters, supra note 104.
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Despite this calculus, it is far from certain that courts would prohibit
conspiracy speech under the current standard. As Mark Tushnet and other
commentators have noted, conspiracy speech, while factually false, is often
“ideologically inflected.”127 This means that the content of conspiracy
speech—while plainly untrue and socially valueless—is often associated
with certain ideological values that receive broad First Amendment
protection.128
For example, QAnon and Pizzagate contain several
recognizable philosophies. Their admiration for ex-President Trump and
deep mistrust of government exhibits libertarian and far-right-wing
sympathies.129 Their belief in the coming Storm, and the following social
utopia, conjures evangelical Christianity.130 Finally, their fear of an elite and
powerful cabal is reminiscent of several conspiracy theories and contains
deeply anti-Semitic undertones.131 David Han pushes this concept even
further, arguing that belief in conspiracy theory is itself an ideological
viewpoint. In Han’s conception, there is ideological import in the very act
of taking an anti-establishment stance, in believing that things are not as they
appear.132 Viewed this way, it is unlikely that courts permit regulation under
the First Amendment. In fact, a majority of Justices on the Alvarez Court
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply to false statements regarding
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, [and] the arts.”133 If such
statements include QAnon and Pizzagate conspiracy speech, any legislation
limiting such speech will likely be struck down.
B. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Acknowledging that existing doctrine is ill-suited to confront emerging
conspiracy speech issues, a different inquiry becomes necessary. As stated
above, the modern First Amendment regime is heavily influenced by the
marketplace of ideas. Within this marketplace, it is claimed, diverse
expressions meet, commingle, bastion one another and battle for supremacy.
Through this dynamic process, the best ideas win out and society arrives at
the greatest conception of truth. Because a functioning market filters
harmful and untrue expression over time, government regulation of speech
becomes unnecessary. In fact, the theory posits that suppressing speech—
even harmful speech—is dangerous to the marketplace because (1)
suppression may chill socially-useful expression; (2) the state may use
suppressive measures to censor political minorities; and (3) the process by
127. Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact
18 (HARV. L. SCH. PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY, Working Paper No.11-02, 2011).
128. Id.
129. Roose, supra note 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Han, supra note 40, at 190.
133. 567 U.S. 709, 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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which truthful ideas conquer false ones actually produces more social value
than had those ideas gone uncontested in the first instance. Thus, the proper
remedy for harmful speech in normal circumstances is counterspeech.
Government intervention is only warranted to combat market failures.
Again, the Brandenburg standard illustrates this concept. The imminence
requirement demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, counterspeech
cannot effectively diffuse incendiary expression. This failure of persuasion
means that the harmful idea wins a place in the market it otherwise should
not have. In the incitement context, this can lead to social harms such as
violent action and lawlessness.
This section will explore how conspiracy speech operates within the
marketplace of ideas. My approach is instrumental rather than absolutist. 134
Although conspiracy speech does not fit neatly within unlawful advocacy or
false speech doctrine, I argue that online conspiracies still trigger the types
of market failures that contemporary First Amendment law attempts to
correct. Because existing doctrine fails to address these market breakdowns,
we must envision new solutions to confront these emerging problems.
Although the marketplace of ideas has theoretical origins in the writings
of John Stuart Mill, John Milton, and James Madison, the conception first
entered American constitutional jurisprudence in Justice Holmes’ Abrams
dissent.
[M]en . . . may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.135

Although briefly described earlier, it is important to spend some time
identifying the assumptions and commitments behind this theory.136 Again,
the central thesis is that society reaches the best conception of truth through
the free trade of ideas in a competitive marketplace. Not only does
competition ensure the most socially-valuable ideas will win out, but the
competitive process reveals why certain ideas are more valuable than others.
Thus, when harmful expression—such as hate speech, misinformation, and
violent advocacy—enter the arena, the proper solution is to counter that
speech with contrary expression. Relatedly, harmful expression can itself be

134. See generally David S. Han, Brandenburg and Terrorism in the Digital Age, 85 BROOK. L. REV.
85 (2019).
135. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. It is important to also clarify that the theory houses different philosophical strands. Justice
Holmes’ conception is essentially libertarian, focusing much attention on the rights of individual
speakers. By contrast, Justice Brandeis was more concerned with democratic stability, noting the
importance of free expression to a community’s political health. FARBER, supra note 51, at 68–69.
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valuable by serving as a social safety-valve.137 Providing an expressive
avenue to angry, bigoted, and hateful individuals ensures their frustrations
do not morph into violent action. Conversely, allowing all ideas into the
market safeguards political minorities from repressive ruling blocs. Read
together, the marketplace is inherently maximalist; the more speech the
better.
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that the marketplace of ideas is
deeply suspicious of government speech suppression.
Rejecting
paternalism, proponents of the marketplace prefer that speech regulation
occur via private ordering. Ensuring such decisions are made democratically
prevents the state from censoring unpopular, but potentially valuable,
opinions, and from prescribing certain orthodoxies upon the community.
Thus, state intervention is only tolerated to ensure a working marketplace.
Despite these lofty goals, commentators have questioned whether the
marketplace functions as advertised. As an initial matter, the theory ignores
external factors that may contribute to an idea’s widespread acceptance. For
example, a particular theory may achieve supremacy within the marketplace
because the speaker is politically powerful, has superior access to economic
resources or communicative channels, or is uniquely persuasive in
conveying her message.138 These influences may be exercised completely
independent of the speech’s social or truthful value. Similarly, the
marketplace suffers from a majoritarian problem. It is fairly evident that just
because some ideas are widely accepted, does not mean that they are the
most true or most socially beneficial.139 The theory overlooks—or more
perniciously, accepts—that some ideas become popular primarily because
they serve the interests of powerful groups. Worse still, people may assume
that consensus equates truth, leading to the long-term reproduction and
survival of harmful expression. One only need look to the eugenics
movement of the early 20th century to confirm this.140 Relatedly, continuing
legacies of white supremacy, gender discrimination, and homo/transphobia
demonstrate the staying power of toxic ideas. Despite their odious content,
the popularity of such expression within the political mainstream likely
ensures their dominance in a competitive marketplace. At an abstract level,
the marketplace can be seen as reproducing many of the problems associated
with liberalism. The competitive spirit of the marketplace of ideas reveals
an inherently capitalist viewpoint. Less generously, it can be viewed as
Darwinian. Marketplace backers argue that, despite these pitfalls, the
unfettered trade in ideas is still superior to government paternalism.141
137. FARBER, supra note 52, at 79.
138. Tsesis, supra note 109, at 12–16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160,
1167 (2015).
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However, international law comparisons demonstrate that these paternalist
fears may be unfounded.142
More narrowly, some commentators believe that the marketplace theory
was never meant to correct the type of misinformation disseminated by
conspiracy theorists. Rather, the theoretical marketplace was conceived to
address debatable matters of ideology, not issues of demonstrable and
verifiable fact.143 Indeed, nascent free speech doctrine of the first half of the
twentieth century was primarily concerned with advocacy and not
description.144 It is possible that this doctrinal tradition implied that the
power of the marketplace of ideas to select for truth was as applicable to
factual as it is to religious, ideological, political, and social truth. But such
concerns were never addressed explicitly. Thus, these scholars concede the
marketplace’s efficacy in the ideological realm, but question its applicability
to questions of objective fact.145
Despite these critiques, the marketplace of ideas has achieved a
hegemonic status within modern First Amendment law. Ironically, the
marketplace evidences its own functionality—the theory has won broad
acceptance against competing ideologies over time. As the critical path is
well-trodden, and because courts are unlikely to abandon the philosophy any
time soon, my argument for regulating conspiracy speech operates within
current jurisprudential parameters. Specifically, online conspiracy speech
implicates several market failures that should be doctrinally and statutorily
addressed.
First, a functioning marketplace presumes that expression serves as a
social safety valve. Harmful speech is preferable to harmful action, so we
allow negative expression to assuage whatever psychic tension the speaker
might be feeling. In the context of QAnon, we tolerate the spread of
conspiracy theory—such as the political elite running a child sex-trafficking
ring—so that the speakers do not target individuals with violent action. As
noted earlier, this rationale has not held in practice.146 Several violent crimes
have been directly or partially inspired by conspiracy speech. Moreover, if
the Capitol Riots are any indication, conspiracy-inspired criminality has
become more prolific and incendiary as speech has proliferated. What
causes this market failure?
The answer likely has to do with the online format in which speech is
disseminated. Mark Tushnet and other commentators have discussed the
concept of internet exceptionalism, which argues that the sui generis nature

142.
143.
144.
145.
(2019).
146.

Tsesis, supra note 109, at 12–16.
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of online speech justifies greater speech regulation.147 These scholars point
to three criteria: (1) Amplification—online speech can be communicated
broadly and instantaneously; (2) Cost—online communication is much less
expensive than traditional modes of speech; and (3) Anonymity—not only
can individuals mask their real-world identities when participating in online
speech, they can concoct entirely new personas.148 This allows online
speakers to act without inhibition, engaging in behaviors and performing
fantasies that might otherwise bring them social opprobrium. While internet
exceptionalism is true of any online expression, the characteristics identified
are especially volatile in the context of conspiracy speech. In particular, the
propensity of online speech to proliferate quickly tests the limits of the safety
valve theory. This is because the safety valve theory assumes a cooling
period—the rationale only holds if negative expression is released into a
neutral environment. When, however, that expression is met instantaneously
with agreement or increasingly hostile versions of the same sentiment, the
effect is cumulative rather than dissipative. Not only that, some online
communities prioritize particularly virulent forms of speech, and may
actually reward the most provocative content with increased distribution. 149
This phenomenon, along with the anonymous nature of online expression,
results is destructive echo chambers, whereby negative speech and emotion
continuously intensifies.150 As Cass Sunstein has noted, this effect “can
dramatically amplify the capacity of speech in one place to cause violence
elsewhere at some uncertain time…”151 The safety valve rationale is thus
turned on its head. Rather than assuaging psychic tensions, harmful speech
combines, proliferates and transmutes into violent action.
A second market failure is the absence of counterspeech. Again, a
functioning marketplace presumes interaction, whereby certain harmful
ideas will be criticized, counterpoised, and revealed as erroneous by more
valuable forms of expression. Without counterspeech, the market fails to run
efficiently and harmful expression takes hold. In the context of conspiracy
speech, both empirical data and personal accounts reveal that conspiracy
message boards operate more as an echo chamber than as an open
marketplace.152 This phenomenon exists on multiple levels. As an initial
matter, internet fora are often segregated by interest, attracting individuals

147. Tushnet, supra note 46; Chen, supra note 46.
148. Chen, supra note 46, at 391.
149. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 147,
149–50 (2012).
150. Id.
151. See Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challenge-to-freespeech.
152. Jaffe & Del Real, supra note 122.
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predisposed to likeminded ideologies.153 In this sense, online congregation
more closely replicates members-only meetings than public squares. Of
course, this is true of many online—and even offline—gathering places, not
just hubs for conspiracy speech. Unpopular speech is often first-expressed
behind closed doors. Ideologies may develop in private, bastioned internally
by assenting voices, before they are revealed to the public and tested in the
marketplace. This is common in both contemporary right-wing groups and
the Marxist collectives of yesteryear. Indeed, this interest-specialization has
also taken hold in society more generally. The advent of partisan news media
delivers politically-curated content and ensures that individuals are lesslikely to be exposed to dissenting opinions. 154 Social media algorithms,
moreover, track users’ search history and tend to reproduce preexisting ideas
and biases.155 In sum, counterspeech exposure is dwindling and the
continued efficacy of rationale is becoming increasingly nebulous.
There is reason to believe, however, that the absence of counterspeech
is particularly acute in online message boards where conspiracies proliferate.
Much of this can be attributed to community norms and standards. In the
context of QAnon, online moderators have played a key role in not only
determining which speech matters, but also who is allowed to speak.156 This
has resulted in membership purges when individuals fail to pass an
ideological purity test. For example, moderators of a significant QAnon
message board began banning users who failed to “keep the faith” after
President Biden’s inauguration.157 The capacity to remove dissenting voices
from online message boards renders counterspeech a lofty goal rather than a
market default.158
Relatedly, moderators wield significant influence in determining which
posts are valuable within particular communities.159 This taste-making
function distributes cache to certain speakers who best meet a particular set

153. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment
Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 77 (2018); Nunziato, supra note
142, at 1527.
154. Mark Jurkowitz et al., U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, PEW
RSCH. CTR., (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the2020-election-a-nation-divided/.
155. Joanna Stern, Social-Media Algorithms Rule How We See the World. Good Luck Trying to Stop
Them, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-algorithms-rule-how-wesee-the-world-good-luck-trying-to-stop-them-11610884800.
156. Brandy Zadrozny & Ben Collins, How Three Conspiracy Theorists Took ‘Q’ and Sparked
Qanon, NBC News (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/how-three-conspiracytheorists-took-q-sparked-qanon-n900531.
157. Ben
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TWITTER
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20,
2021, 2:09
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2021),
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of standards. Often times, value is assigned to posts that closely reproduce
the moderators’ viewpoint in the most incendiary way.160 This results in a
grooming effect—speakers are incentivized toward ideological assent as a
means of social recognition.161 This incentive structure may be particularly
tantalizing for individuals who are outcast or exiled in more traditional
communities. Moreover, the reward for valued speech is often increased
exposure.162 This serves a dual function. The incendiary message not only
reaches wider audiences, but also signals to other members what valuable
speech looks like. All this serves to reproduce particular viewpoints and shut
out counterspeech.
Finally, particular demographic attributes present in online conspiracy
communities may further reduce the efficacy of counterspeech. One such
example is the tendency of conspiracy followers to withdraw from other
speech venues.163 As stated earlier, community incentive structures may
appeal to individuals that typically operate outside of conventional social
networks or suffer from mental illness.164 Thus, loners, social outcasts, and
the mentally-ill may find homes within these communities that they lack
elsewhere. This predatory baiting is a particularly pernicious aspect of
online conspiracy fora. Beyond that, however, conspiracy speech seems
especially adept at conscripting individuals from other networks into the
conspiracy community. Put another way, followers choose to associate with
fellow conspiracy theorists over traditional relations such as friends and
family.165 Countless personal accounts document this phenomenon—
someone’s parent or child becomes increasingly withdrawn, in contact lessfrequently, only willing to engage in certain subject matter discourse.166 In
this sense, conspiracy forums become the predominant, if not exclusive,
speech venue in which these persons participate. What is less clear is why
this tends to happen. One reason could be that conspiracy speech’s objective
garb tends to persuade followers that they have uncovered an unfettered
reality. Operating under this assumption, these individuals may prefer

160. Kevin Roose, ‘False Flag’ Theory on Pipe Bombs Zooms from Right-Wing Fringe to
Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/business/false-flagtheory-bombs-conservative-media.html.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Louise Hall, Former QAnon Follower Compares Movement to Drug and Alcohol Addiction, THE
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/qanoncovid-conspiracy-theory-rein-lively-b1816755.html.
164. Jan-Willem van Prooijen, The Psychology of Qanon: Why Do Seemingly Sane People Believe
Bizarre
Conspiracy
Theories?,
NBC
NEWS
(Aug.
13,
2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/psychology-qanon-why-do-seemingly-sane-people-believebizarre-conspiracy-ncna900171.
165. Hall, supra note 163.
166. QAnon
Casualties,
REDDIT
(last
visited
May
11,
2021),
https://www.reddit.com/r/QAnonCasualties/; Dickson, supra note 112.
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discourse with the similarly “enlightened.”
Relatedly, a unifying
characteristic among conspiracy speakers seems to be a severe distrust of
institutional authority.167 This may render followers less likely to seek
information from sources outside the conspiracy community. Another factor
could be that progressive “information” reveals, such as Q drops, are
psychologically stimulating.168 Because Q could release a bombshell at any
time, followers may choose conspiracy speech over more quotidian realities.
A fourth reason may have to do with membership stigma. Conspiracy
followers may be renounced or disclaimed by traditional network ties for
participation in such speech, leaving online message boards as their only
viable communities.169 Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic, which foreclosed
many traditional speech venues, may well have exacerbated these
problems.170 Again, these suggestions are not backed by detailed empirical
research and thus form only individual or speculative accounts. It seems
evident, however, that these qualities make counterspeech less viable in this
context.

V. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP
Because online conspiracy speech is an emerging phenomenon, there
has been little academic treatment of the subject directly. That being said,
commentators have produced scholarship in adjacent fields—such as cyber
terrorism and hate speech—that ostensibly address the issues caused by
harmful online expression. These solutions can be roughly categorized into
two groups: (1) Judicial and (2) Legislative. This section provides a
topography of recent scholarship and identifies the edifying strengths and
potential pitfalls of each.
A. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
1. Overrule Brandenburg
The most far-reaching judicial solutions call for the wholesale
abandonment of Brandenburg and its progeny. These scholars presume that
Brandenburg has either outlasted its relevance or was incorrectly decided in
the first instance.171 Regarding the former, some commentators believe
Brandenburg to be stuck in the past. Conceptualizing the standard in

167. Joe Pierre, The QAnon Conspiracy Theory: Mistrust and Mass Appeal, PSYCH. TODAY (Nov. 4,
2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/psych-unseen/201911/the-qanon-conspiracy-theorymistrust-and-mass-appeal.
168. Hall, supra note 163.
169. Jaffe & Del Real, supra note 122.
170. Ali Breland & Sinduja Rangarajan, How the Coronavirus Spread QAnon, MOTHER JONES (June
23, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/06/qanon-coronavirus/.
171. Tsesis, supra note 109, at 12–16.

Winter 2021

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF QANON

27

instrumental terms, they argue that Brandenburg should be understood as a
pragmatic doctrine reflecting “technological and social conditions of its
time—one that may grow obsolete as those conditions shift.”172 Specifically,
they point to changing technological circumstances as fundamentally
altering the policy balance originally struck by the Brandenburg court.173 In
1969, when Brandenburg was decided, harmful expression was primarily
disseminated physically via forms like pamphlets, leaflets, in-person
meetings, and public gatherings.174 The physical medium imposed both
economic and temporal costs on speakers, severely limiting their capacity to
reach mass audiences instantaneously. In particular, fringe groups were
likely to lack the material and structural resources necessary to realize a
mainstream platform. In this context, limiting government regulation to
circumstances where unlawful advocacy is directed toward inciting, and
likely to produce, imminent lawless action seemed an appropriate balance.
Today, by contrast, speech is “disseminated widely and cheaply via the
internet and channeled through social media.”175 This novel format allows
for groups to proliferate and expand beyond anything the Brandenburg Court
could have conceived. Put simply, the propensity for speech to incite
violence has increased exponentially while the government’s power to
regulate has remained stagnant. As a result, tragic events such as the Pulse
nightclub shooting,176 the Boston Marathon bombings,177 and the El Paso
shootings178 have all been directly linked to online terrorist advocacy.
Although such speech has catalyzed very tangible harms, it is considered
“abstract”—and thus protected—under prevailing First Amendment
doctrine. Understanding the internet to have irrevocably moved the goal
posts, these scholars argue that Brandenburg should be recalibrated to
address modern concerns.179
More drastically, some commentators believe that Brandenburg
severely underestimated the dangers of harmful expression in the first
instance. In particular, these scholars argue that Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement fails to accurately characterize the process by which advocacy
befalls violence.180 As touched upon earlier, ideologically-motivated violent

172. Han, supra note 134, at 86–87.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 100.
175. Id. at 86.
176. Orlando Nightclub Shooting: How the Attack Unfolded, BBC (June 15, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36511778.
177. James Gordon Meek, FBI Feared Boston Bombers ‘Received Training’ and Aid from Terror
Group, Docs Say, ABC NEWS (May 21, 2014), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fbi-feared-bostonbombers-received-training-aid-terror/story?id=23819429.
178. Texas Walmart Shooting: El Paso Attack ‘Domestic Terrorism’, BBC (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49226573.
179. Han, supra note 134, at 86–87.
180. Tsesis, supra note 109, at 12–16.
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crimes are not committed in a vacuum. Rather, they seem to result from
prolonged exposure to harmful expression, whereby one’s worldview is
oriented increasingly toward hostile ideologies. As Alexander Tsesis notes,
“[a]ngry words, spoken in the heat of the moment, may result in violence.
But the entrenchment of outgroup hatred in an entire culture takes time and
has far more impact than spontaneous aggression.”181 Again, this is hardly
farfetched. Some of the worst human rights atrocities have been preceded
by virulent and dehumanizing propaganda campaigns. Speech of this nature
stokes preexisting biases and blames certain disfavored groups for social ills.
When this speech is repeated, speakers and listeners are desensitized to the
violence of its content. Thus, “[t]here is a close, and virtually necessary,
connection between advocacy, preparation, coordination, infrastructure
development, training, indoctrination, desensitization, discrimination,
singular violent acts, and systematic oppression.”182 By proscribing
regulation save imminently lawless expression, these commentators argue
that Brandenburg treats the symptoms and not the illness.
Central to these critiques is the idea that the First Amendment has
achieved hegemonic status within the hierarchy of constitutional values—so
much so that free speech is not simply prioritized over other amendments,
but is elevated over intrinsic human rights such as dignity and safety from
bodily harm. Commentators question whether this arrangement is an
appropriate reflection of social priorities.183 While such notions may first
appear sacrilegious, viewed outside our hegemonic context they are not
unpersuasive. Should we seriously be in the business of protecting
expression to the point of real and tangible harms? As Justice Jackson stated,
“[t]he Constitution is not a suicide pact.”184 Is, for example, speech that
falsely denounces the Sandy Hook massacre as a hoax worth the trauma
inflicted on survivors and family members?185 Should we continue to
legitimize cross burnings in the yards of Black families?186 These questions
implicate our deepest values and will likely yield difficult answers. In
theorizing solutions, these scholars often look toward European nations as
reference points, indicating that democratic societies frequently regulate
harmful speech without invoking the specter of authoritarian censorship.187
Viewed comparatively, such doctrinal change is not beyond imagination.

181. Id. at 11.
182. Id. at 10.
183. Id. at 12–16.
184. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
185. Daniel Trotta, Infowars Founder Who Claimed Sandy Hook Shooting Was a Hoax Ordered to
Pay $100,000, REUTERS (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-lawsuit-alexjones/infowars-founder-who-claimed-sandy-hook-shooting-was-a-hoax-ordered-to-pay-100000idUSKBN1YZ1BB.
186. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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The clear pitfall of such critiques, however, is that absent philosophical
sea change, it is unlikely the Court will be willing to accept such reforms.
As mentioned previously, the prevailing liberal speech regime prefers more
speech to regulation. In fields as broad as incitement or hate speech,
arguments favoring more restrictive standards will likely be met with severe
resistance. Again, this reticence is likely to be amplified in the First
Amendment context because of its place within our constitutional design.
2. Maintain Brandenburg
On the other hand, many commentators feel that current First
Amendment doctrine strikes the appropriate balance between speech and
regulation. Taking a deontological perspective, they argue that Brandenburg
correctly reflects certain essential values necessary to any meaningful free
speech regime.188 In this sense, the standard for government regulation exists
at a fixed point—it is not something to be recalibrated with changing
circumstances.189 These scholars point to the myriad technological advances
that took place in the 20th century and will continue into the 21st.190 Because
society has survived since Brandenburg with little jurisprudential
adjustment, it makes little sense to abandon course. Further, tailoring First
Amendment law each and every technological advancement would result in
doctrinal incoherence.
More persuasively, these scholars rightfully recognize that exaggerated
national security concerns have often resulted in restrictions on individual
freedoms.191 In this sense, the present fear of cyber terrorism—or online
conspiracy speech—is little different than the specter of Communism in the
early 20th century.192 Knowing that periods like the Red Scare or
McCarthyism are now considered indelible stains on our constitutional
democracy, we can choose to resist modern temptations to suppress rather
than regress into familiar pitfalls. These dangers are especially stark against
the backdrops of power and identity. Suppression tends to affect
marginalized and disempowered groups more saliently than those in the
mainstream.193 First, this brand of ideological repression masks more
pernicious biases such as ethnonationalism and race hatred. Second, affected
groups—due to lack of resources, liminal legal status, and social disfavor—
are less able to combat suppressive measures. Considered together, the
dangers in regulating speech will always far outweigh the dangers of some
abstract threat at some abstract time.
188. Han, supra note 134, at 87.
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While this perspective has admirable and edifying strengths, its
approach underestimates the transformative quality of the internet.
Television and radio were certainly extraordinary communicative
interventions, but they lack the interactive capacity of online speech. As
stated earlier, the internet reimagines temporal barriers, speaker/audience
dichotomies, and public forums. These attributes make it possible for speech
to proliferate, persuade, and shape sensibilities in ways never before
imagined. Ignoring these fundamental changes—or pretending they are
substantively indistinguishable from prior technological innovations—is a
poor way to meet emerging constitutional challenges. Further, the internet
tends to both alter and exacerbate the relational concerns identified in the
previous paragraph. As scholars have noted, hate speech and ethnocentric
advocacy have found comfortable homes in the online forum.194 Such
speech has demonstrable links to violent action.195
B. LEGISLATIVE
Commentators have also proposed solutions beyond adjusting the black
letter law. Most notoriously, in the realm of cyberterrorism, Eric Posner
suggested a statute that would criminalize “accessing websites that glorify,
express support for, or provide encouragement for ISIS” or “ISIS
recruitment.”196 Other provisions would outlaw distributing links to those
websites, or even disseminating website content such as text, videos, or
images.197 Obviously, existing doctrine would also have to change
considerably for this law to be upheld as constitutional. Still, this proposal
represents the draconian measures some scholars are willing to take to
combat online incitement.
On the false speech side, one commentator proposed establishing a
licensing regime for journalists.198 Like other professional industries—such
as the legal and medical fields—a strict licensing scheme would subject
journalists to a rigorous set of occupational and ethical standards.199 In
particular, professional membership would be predicated upon increased
public responsibility, whereby journalists take on a fiduciary role in
“guard[ing] [the] democratic discourse.”200 This scheme would be enforced
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195. Id.
196. Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalizat
ion_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html.
197. Id.
198. Manzi, supra note 45, at 2649.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 650.

Winter 2021

REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF QANON

31

by statutory discipline, professional ethics committees, and continuing
education requirements.201
While these ideas represent novel and ambitious solutions to emerging
free speech problems, both contain critical flaws. As mentioned above,
Posner’s suggestion is unworkable absent dramatic doctrinal overhaul. In
fact, his suggestion would require far greater constitutional transformation
than a mere recalibration of Brandenburg—enacting such a statute would
entail reimagining our First Amendment regime wholesale. Courts are
therefore unlikely to acquiesce no matter how compelling the countervailing
interest. Beyond its unworkability, though, the proposed statute implicates
a slew of policy concerns. First, the provisions are obviously draconian,
providing criminal sanctions for actions as innocuous as sharing links or
relaying website content. While there are statutory carve-outs for
journalistic and research purposes, speakers engaged in what is currently
considered “pure advocacy” would undoubtedly be subject to prosecution.
Further, a robust intent requirement would be necessary to prevent overpolicing and criminalizing accidental disseminations. Second, the statue is
acutely content-based, solely criminalizing speech related to a single terrorist
group. ISIS is undeniably unique in its capacity for heinous action, but
outlawing advocacy no matter how abstract would result in government
eradication of an entire ideology—an unprecedented level of authoritarian
censorship. Third, the statute is largely directed against foreign terrorist
advocacy. At a pragmatic level, most speakers transmitting ISIS propaganda
are likely to be located beyond American criminal jurisdiction. More
troublesome, however, is the likelihood that Muslim and Arab groups will
be disproportionately prosecuted under this statute. Such dragnetting is not
uncommon in our nation’s history.202 This discriminatory impact raises a
host of equal protection concerns.
Whereas Posner’s measures are excessive, it can be argued that the
licensing scheme does not go far enough. While journalists should be held
to high ethical standards, placing the disciplinary onus on them
misunderstands the problem. The vast majority of “fake news” and
misinformation originates with ideological groups and political operatives,
not professional journalists. Professional licensing standards could serve as
a valuable source identifier, assisting audiences to distinguish between
factual information and blatant falsehoods. However, it does little to regulate
“alternative” forums where the most harmful forms of speech proliferate.
Relatedly, certain audiences are severely distrustful of “legitimate” news
sources. Thus, several problems ignited by misinformation exist beyond the
scope of professional journalism.
201. Id.
202. Shubh Mather, Surviving the Dragnet: ‘Special Interest’ Detainees in the US after 9/11, 47 RACE
& CLASS 31, 31-46 (2006).
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On the other hand, a licensing scheme could be both socially and
constitutionally problematic if it restricted access to information. Privileging
facts to a distinct elite class would spur fears of indoctrination and social
control. Moreover, it could blur the line the free press and other elite
institutions. Transforming the press into an elite professional class may
compromise its most valuable function—serving as check on political
power.

VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This article seeks to fill academic interstices with a solution of its own.
Inspired by prior scholarship, I propose an adjudicatory model that identifies
and excludes conspiracy speech from Constitutional protection. Through
this scheme, the First Amendment can be deployed to address tangibly
harmful expression without sacrificing its essential character.
My solution reimagines First Amendment law by creating a doctrinal
exception for online conspiracy speech. Under this regime, regulation is
permissible where there is (1) intentional (2) online proliferation of (3)
factually false speech with a (4) demonstrable link to violent action. In broad
strokes, this would allow either congressional legislation or private party
action to enjoin speech fora that meet the aforementioned criteria. From a
pragmatic standpoint, regulation would target moderator accounts
responsible for housing the speech in question. Placing liability on
community standard-bearers ensures the model is both workable and
effective.
The proposed test is essentially cumulative. Prohibition is only
permitted where the speech at issue implicates the various market failures,
policy concerns, and characteristics of low-value speech touched upon
earlier in this article. For example, because conspiracy speech houses both
the violent proclivities of unlawful advocacy and the mis-informative
tendencies of false expression, there is greater justification for government
regulation. Where these factors are triggered, the policy balance struck by
existing doctrine destabilizes. The potential social harm comes to outweigh
countervailing concerns over censorship and suppression. Put another way,
the conspiracy speech at issue is rendered so valueless—indeed, so outside
the realm of First Amendment concern—that it falls below first-tier
protection. Having more in common with obscenity, fighting words, and
true threats, the speech becomes ripe for regulation.
A. PROPOSED MODEL
1. Intentional Proliferation
Intentionality is a threshold consideration. Suppression of online
conspiracy speech is only warranted where either the speaker intends to
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cause tangible harm and is aware that the speech at issue has a proclivity do
so. These requirements ensure that regulation is neither arbitrary nor
draconian. Unlike Posner’s solution, the one-off or naïve poster understands
that she will not be legally sanctioned for participation within the online
forum. In essence then, the intentionality requirement places liability on the
moderator of the online conspiracy forum rather than individual speakers.203
This makes sense for a variety of reasons. First, moderators exercise broad
control over the online communities they manage.204 These individuals have
the power to shape expressive norms, regulate forum membership, and
curate the range of permissible content within a particular forum.205 As such,
moderators bear responsibility for the speech environment they foster. They
cannot claim ignorance of the toxic nature of speech when they are directly
involved in facilitating it. This is particularly so where moderators, such as
those running QAnon forums, become aware of lawless action associated
with and inspired by their forum’s content.
Second, fixing liability on moderators avoids the Disrupter/True
Believer distinction mentioned in Part III. Under the intentionality
requirement, it does not matter whether the moderator actually believes in
the proliferating conspiracy, or is simply wielding it for personal or political
gain. Personal motivation becomes irrelevant to the inquiry—and for good
reason. Probing the individual’s mind produces evidentiary complications.
Discerning whether someone acted with the requisite malice sufficient to
trigger liability is an extremely difficult threshold to meet. Motivation can
be ambiguous and is often comprised of cumulative and conflicting
incentives. An online moderator may truly believe in the speech’s content
while also harboring awareness that dissemination improves her station or
accomplishes a personal goal. These considerations merely distract from the
issue at hand. By focusing on the intention to disseminate despite awareness
of harm, this test avoids these complications. The requisite showing simply
requires a finding of (1) constructive awareness of tangible harm followed
by (2) continued proliferation.
Third, moderator liability assuages pragmatic concerns. In online fora,
where thousands of people interact anonymously, it can be difficult to locate
discrete speakers. Moderators, on the other hand, occupy much more
prominent roles within online communities.206 These individuals frequently

203. Several commentators and politicians have suggested reworking 47 U.S.C. § 230, which
generally provides immunity to website platforms for third-party content. Amending § 230 would subject
social media companies to suit for housing harmful speech on their platforms. Although this proposed
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exhibit visible tags that draw attention to their managerial position. 207 Even
where those titles are absent, message board settings often contain
identifying information.208 Because moderators are tasked with policing
community norms, they must be responsive to group concern.209 Where
forum members feel a shared standard has been violated, their first and often
only form of recourse it to contact the moderator.210 Finally, the hierarchical
structure of online communities ensures that moderators are frequently
referenced by other members.211 As moderators wield significant influence
within an online community, sub-members may quote, acknowledge, or
appeal to moderators in espousing a particular viewpoint.212 All these factors
combine to reduce informational costs.
Fourth, moderator liability also limits causation issues. As difficult as
it is to discern the identity an anonymous online speaker, it can be even more
difficult to pinpoint the specific incendiary post responsible for inciting
lawless action. Online forums house a multiplicity of different voices.
Whereas prior manifestations of criminal incitement might resemble a
charismatic speaker addressing an angry crowed, that dichotomy collapses
in the online world. Numerous and diverse posters interact with and build
off one another, creating a collective expression. Crowd and speaker are
rendered one and the same. Readers then interact with this content over time
and at different times. It becomes functionally impossible to identify both
the individual post or the precise temporal moment where the reader is stirred
to action. This is all to say that lawlessness is not inspired by the discrete
viewpoint of an individual speaker, but the cumulative effect of a toxic
chorus.213 The intentionality requirement addresses this issue by reallocating
liability to environmental management rather than the noxious content of
individual posts
Last, moderators often exercise control over the entire forum. This
control often includes a deactivation power.214 Fixing liability on the
moderator ensures that the legal test is not a paper tiger. Holding moderators
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responsible would address the communal aspect of online conspiracy speech
by shutting down the distribution site.
Online Dissemination
My proposed test limits conspiracy speech regulation to online
expression. In essence, more traditional forms of speech do not implicate
the type of market failures spurred by electronic mediums. Displaced from
internet fora, conspiracy theories are again regulated by counterspeech and
mitigated by cooling periods. “Real-world” expression does not amplify
immediately to global audiences. In-person conspiracies are not confined
within dangerous echo chambers. The conditions for market failure—
conditions that catalyze the need for regulation in the first instance—are
absent from consideration. Put another way, traditional conspiracy speech
does not functionally realign the policy balance struck by Supreme Court
precedent. By restricting regulation to online conspiracy speech, my
proposed solution supplements Brandenburg rather than displaces it.
As such, the proposed model is faithful to principles of stare decisis.
Creating a new test for online conspiracy speech avoids the difficult policy
decisions inherent in abandoning canonical, and largely workable, doctrine.
Legal change need not be so black and white. Rather, the supplementary
approach simply conscribes Brandenburg to the situations it was originally
envisioned to govern. As commentators have noted, the Justices in
Brandenburg could not have possibly imagined the communicative
intervention caused by the internet.215 We can accept that premise as true
without necessarily implying that the decision must be discarded. As such,
Brandenburg can continue as the standard for tangible incidents of criminal
incitement while online conspiracy speech can be assessed under a different
legal test.
2. Factual Falsity
Third, my proposed solution limits regulation to speech that is factually
false. This requirement has two prongs. First, the speech at issue must be
expressed as factual. The legal test only implicates speech that purports to
describe reality as it actually exists. Second, the factual expression must be
capable of being objectively disproved.
The first prong seeks to differentiate ideological advocacy from rank
misinformation. Distinguishing between the two is central to the test’s
workability. Ideas are largely sacred within free speech doctrine, falling
squarely within the First Amendment’s core protections.216 As such, any test
that proscribes ideology is likely to be met by strong constitutional challenge.
On the other hand, factual falsity—negligible in value—has historically
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received far less deference.217 The issue with conspiracy speech, as Mark
Tushnet has deftly identified, is that factually false statements can be
ideologically inflected.218 False claims at times come to be associated with
higher forms of expression, such as politics, religion, and philosophy.219
Despite that complication, the ideological inflection of any particular fact
exists on a spectrum rather than on a distinct plane. Some facts bare closer
relation to lofty ideals.220 Moreover, some ideas are considered more
valuable—and thus receive more protection—than others. Such a spectrum
necessarily implies a point where the negative value of the factually-false
expression outweighs the value produced by ideological association. While
that may be a conceptually difficult distinction to make, it is necessary to
regulate the tangible threats posed by online conspiracy speech. Moreover,
there are factors to assist judicial decision-making.
The primary indicator is where speech is phrased as empirical rather
than ideological. Put a different way, the speech at issue must be descriptive
rather than normative. Any proscribed messaging should intend to describe
world conditions as they objectively exist rather than advocating what they
should be. Here, the evidentiary touchstone is confusion. The key
distinction between ideological advocacy and the spread of misinformation
exists in the discrepancy between persuasion and deception. Advocacy
implies a certain awareness on the part of the listener. Ideological
participants understand they are subscribing to a particular worldview—
there is conscious choice to adopt a value system consistent with preexisting
beliefs and normative ideations. Even where ideologues understand their
beliefs to be “true” or superior, there is a recognition that competing
philosophies exist. On the other hand, individuals misled by conspiracy
speech may be naïve to the fact they are being deceived. Agency drops from
the equation. Rather, the conspiracy theory is received as singular and
objective fact, warping the way listeners interact with the world around them.
There are countless stories from former QAnon believers recounting feelings
of delusion and betrayal.221 These individuals suffered tangible harms for
participation in the conspiracy, including losses of time, resource, familial
association, and even personal liberty.222 This plethora of evidence makes it
possible to differentiate between descriptive and normative expression.
Second, it must be possible to objectively disprove the speech at issue.
As David Han posits, the conspiracies must live in the “realm of
demonstrable falsity.”223 This means that the speech does not purport to
217.
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describe nebulous realms outside the grasp of human knowledge.224 There
are some topics that fundamentally evade understanding. It is impossible,
for instance, for any one person to concretely prove the existence of God, or
alternate dimensions, or the possibility of extraterrestrial life. Implicating
any of these topics would result in expressive chill and potentially curtail
scientific advancement. As such, these issues fall without the proposed test.
On the other hand, some factual claims are easily disproven. For example,
satellite imaging clearly shows that earth is spherical rather than flat.225
President Obama’s birth certificate expressly refutes that he was born in
Kenya.226 Finally, a basic floor plan of Comet Ping Pong pizzeria negates
the existence of a basement pedophilia ring.227 Counterevidence of this
nature brings conspiracy speech within the regulatory ambit.
3. History of Violence
The final factor requires that speech be linked with a demonstrable
history of violence. Conspiracy speech of the type imagined here produces
real-world, physical injury.228 Any regulated speech then must be associated
with tangible manifestations of violent action. There are three important
points to clarify. First, psychic injury falls below the relevant threshold for
speech regulation. While psychological harms are undoubtedly damaging to
the individual, they are difficult to both quantify and prove. Attempting to
discern when exactly expression caused emotional injury—and the
magnitude of such injury—results in evidentiary challenges. Limiting
regulation to violent crime avoids these issues. Second, the speech must
inspire the violent action in some way—it is not enough that the expression
be obliquely associated with lawless behavior. While the temporal
connection need not be imminent, there must be some causal link between
the speech and lawless act. Third, regulation under this test requires a history
of violent action rather than a few isolated incidents. This ensures that
speakers and moderators are not held accountable for the behavior of discrete
bad actors. Criminal law correctly places liability on criminal defendants for
the individual manifestations of violent conduct. Requiring a discernible
violent legacy ensures that regulatory focus remains on expression. Each of
these three requirements prevent regulation from becoming overbroad.
Finally, association with past violence avoids prior constraint issues.
Under this factor, speech and speech forums are allowed to proliferate until
they become incontrovertibly related to social harm. In this light, the
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proposed model avoids prospective chill. Regulation can only proceed in
retrospect.
B. AREAS OF CONCERN
Although my proposed model attempts to find the least-restrictive
means by which to regulate conspiracy speech, it is far from perfect. Like
any expressive limitation, fixing the correct policy balance implicates
tradeoffs. Some may find the test unduly restrictive while others argue it
does not go far enough. New doctrine inspires new, and often perceptive
criticism—these are the wages of policymaking.
As an initial matter, one could plausibly assert that the proposed
exception is too narrow to warrant judicial consideration. Put another way,
the suggested model seems acutely limited to conspiracies such as QAnon
and Pizzagate. Although the test is well-suited to address these heartland
concerns, the next conspiracy theory may implicate new issues requiring
different legal factors. The propensity of conspiracies to originate and
transform would lead to constant judicial tinkering. While that criticism is
warranted, my proposed solution may still find broader applicability.
Consider a situation where an online forum spreads scientifically refutable
misinformation that a particular racial group is responsible for a discrete
social malady. Believing the theory to be true, conspiracy participants go on
to violently assault members of that racial class. Although posed in general
terms, this is hardly a hypothetical circumstance. As of this writing, Asian
Americans and Asian Pacific Islanders continue to experience raciallymotivated attacks stemming from a purported connection to the COVID-19
virus.229 Despite demonstrable falsity—along with significant public
awareness campaigns— people continue to mistakenly blame this
demographic group for the inception and spread of the pandemic.230 Under
the proposed test, government regulators could shut down the online forum
spreading such misinformation.
The issue of cyberterrorism is a more difficult case. Although
cyberterrorist advocacy intentionally disseminates socially-harmful
messaging across electronic fora, it frequently implicates high speech
concerns.231 Terrorist advocacy then may be too ideologically inflected to
meet the proposed standard. In particular, where terrorist speech is driven
by religious fundamentalism, such expression may find safe harbor within
229. Nicole Hong & Jonah E. Bromwich, Asian-Americans Are Being Attacked. Why Are Hate Crime
Charges So Rare?, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/nyregion/asianhate-crimes.html.
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the core of the First Amendment. More still, speech of this nature is difficult
to factually disprove. Terrorist expression may not lay claim to objective
reality, but rather advocate the supremacy of a particular world vision. Such
normative, prescriptive speech would seemingly render the proposed model
overbroad. As such, supplemental methods may be required to curb terrorist
advocacy.
Further, placing liability on forum moderators, rather than discrete
speakers, could be met with a Claiborne Hardware challenge.232 Claiborne
generally limits associational liability in speech contexts. To overcome
Claiborne’s general proscription, the government must show that (1) the
advocacy group’s goals were unlawful and (2) that its members intended to
further those goals.233 Where conspiracy theories have a history of
demonstrable violence, however, they might meet this high standard.
Continued dissemination of false speech despite awareness of its propensity
to cause social harm would seemingly satisfy both prongs of the Claiborne
test. Further, the false nature of conspiracy speech may render Claiborne
distinguishable. Whereas the boycott at issue in Claiborne implicated
political speech at the heart of the First Amendment, demonstrably false
speech is more susceptible to regulation.234
Moreover, requiring legacies of violent action could rightfully trigger
humanitarian criticism. Specifically, delaying regulation until speech can be
tangibly linked to repeated instances of violence appears as mistaken
prioritization. I tend to agree with this assessment. Allowing toxic
expression to transform into tangible harm feels like sacrificing life at the
altar of speech. At the same time, the presiding speech regime has
determined that this is the price paid for free expression. In order to maintain
workability, the test has been specifically constructed to avoid prior restraint
and overbreadth.
Finally, regulating conspiracy speech may implicate more fundamental
concerns. Despite the borderline preposterous content espoused by QAnon
and Pizzagate, the conspiracies essentially stem from fear of governmental
control. These theories evince an anxiety of autonomy—an essential distress
that individuals no longer control their own destinies. Rather, an entrenched
network of elites dictates the structures and institutions that give shape to our
social reality. As such, fear of expressive regulation—already a paradigm
First Amendment concern—is particularly acute in the realm of conspiracy
speech. Proscribing conspiratorial expression may compound feelings of
powerlessness among believers—indeed, may provide more evidence that
the system is rigged against them. Should this happen, speech prohibition
might have the ironic effect of spurring the same social harm it had originally
232. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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intended to regulate. Still, this argument can be made in many scenarios.
Fear of reprisal exists wherever the government tries to regulate dangerous
or unstable populations. In the meantime, people are killed, believers misled,
and capitols breached. Fear of reaction can never excuse inaction.

VII. CONCLUSION
Conspiracy theory is increasingly becoming public reality. Once
considered fringe expression, the internet has legitimized conspiracy speech
by making it available to global audiences under the guise of objective fact.
Such issues should be considered seriously. Conspiracies pose a threat to
our democracy, not only figuratively, but—as congresspersons can attest
to— literally. Despite their farfetched content, conspiracies tend to inspire
fervent and faithful followings. Where passions are enflamed, and realities
distorted, conspiracy speech can quickly become felony harm. This is
already happening, in violent crescendo. The injurious legacy of QAnon
should be instructive for legal commentators and judicial actors. As
conspiracies continue to generate and take new forms, First Amendment law
must adapt in kind.

